Evolutionary stability and tenable strategy blocks

DOI10.1007/S00199-026-01701-8MaRDI QIDQ7397481zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Tyler Porter, Peter Wikman

Publication date 2026

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00199-026-01701-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites work

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• Nash blocks
• On evolutionarily stable sets
• On the evolutionary selection of sets of Nash equilibria
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Persistent equilibria in strategic games
• Refined best reply correspondence and dynamics
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
• Solid outcomes in finite games
• Stable equilibria and forward induction
• Tenable Strategy Blocks and Settled Equilibria
• The logic of animal conflict
• The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games

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