Incentive magnitude effects in experimental games: bigger is not necessarily better

DOI10.3390/G9010004MaRDI QIDQ1651864zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Briony D. Pulford, Andrew M. Colman, Graham Loomes

Publication date 10 July 2018

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g9010004

zbMATH Keywords

capital-labor-production frameworkcrowding outexperimental gamesincentive elasticity of effortincentivesreasons for choices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90)

Review text

Summary: In experimental games, task-related incentives are payments to experimental subjects that vary according to their strategy choices and the consequent outcomes of the games. Limited evidence exists regarding incentive magnitude effects in experimental games. We examined one-off strategy choices and self-reported reasons for choices in eight \(3\times 3\) and four \(4\times 4\) normal-form games under task-related incentives of conventional magnitude and compared them with choices and reasons in the same games under incentives five times as large. Both strategy choices and self-reported reasons for choices were almost indistinguishable between the two conditions. These results are in line with earlier findings on individual decision making and with a parametric model, in which the incentive elasticity of effort is very small when compared with other factors, such as the complexity of the decision problem.

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Cited in

(5)

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