Optimization incentive and relative riskiness in experimental stag-hunt games

DOI10.1007/s00182-011-0290-xzbMath1274.91116MaRDI QIDQ422361

D. Dubois, P. Van Nguyen, Marc Willinger

Publication date: 16 May 2012

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0290-x

zbMATH Keywords

experimental economics; coordination game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91A90: Experimental studies

Related Items

Classification by decomposition: a novel approach to classification of symmetric \(2\times 2\) games, The determinants of efficient behavior in coordination games

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