Firing threats: incentive effects and impression management

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.02.015MaRDI QIDQ2347772zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hernán-González, Stephen J. Rassenti

Publication date 8 June 2015

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/economics_articles/165

zbMATH Keywords

firing threatsimpression managementincentives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80)

Recommendations

• INCENTIVES AND THE COST OF FIRING IN AN EQUILIBRIUM LABOR MARKET MODEL WITH ENDOGENOUS LAYOFFS*
• Dynamic incentive contracts with termination threats
• Experimental perspectives on incentives in organisations
• Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation
• Incentives and individual motivation in supervised work groups

Cites work

• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
• Piece Rates, Fixed Wages and Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment
• Putting Behavioral Economics to Work: Testing for Gift Exchange in Labor Markets Using Field Experiments
• Rank-Sum Tests for Clustered Data
• Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions

Cited in

(2)

• Goal setting in the principal-agent model: weak incentives for strong performance
• Unethical decision making and sleep restriction: experimental evidence

This page was built for publication: Firing threats: incentive effects and impression management

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2347772)