Firing threats: incentive effects and impression management
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Publication:2347772
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.015zbMath1318.91134OpenAlexW2076896409MaRDI QIDQ2347772
Roberto Hernán-González, Brice Corgnet, Stephen J. Rassenti
Publication date: 8 June 2015
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/economics_articles/165
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Cites Work
- Putting Behavioral Economics to Work: Testing for Gift Exchange in Labor Markets Using Field Experiments
- Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
- Piece Rates, Fixed Wages and Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment
- Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions
- Rank-Sum Tests for Clustered Data
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