Recommendations
Cites work
- A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality)
- Cooperation in Community Interaction without Information Flows
- Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching
- Cooperative behavior and the frequency of social interaction
- Sequential Equilibria
- Social Norms and Community Enforcement
- Social norms and random matching games
- Social norms, information, and trust among strangers: theory and evidence
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
- Trust, reciprocity, and social history
Cited in
(6)- Interpersonal trust: asymptotic analysis of a stochastic coordination game with multi-agent learning
- When is trust robust?
- Social norms, information, and trust among strangers: theory and evidence
- Trust and culture
- Enforcing social norms: trust-building and community enforcement
- Generalized trust and sustainable coexistence between socially responsible firms and nonprofit organizations
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