Dynamic matching games: stationary equilibria under varying commitments

DOI10.3934/JDG.2025039MaRDI QIDQ7237618zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Nadia Guiñazú, Pablo Neme, Jorge Oviedo

Publication date 30 April 2026

Published in Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3934/JDG.2025039

zbMATH Keywords

commitmentdynamic matching gamestable matchingsstationary equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites work

• A dynamic school choice model
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Decentralized job matching
• Decentralized matching markets with endogenous salaries
• Decentralized matching: the role of commitment
• Dynamically stable matching
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 51788 (Why is no real title available?)
• Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
• Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
• Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets

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