Consistent conjectures in dynamic matching markets
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Cites work
- An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Dynamically stable matching
- Farsighted coalitional stability
- Farsighted objections and maximality in one-to-one matching problems
- Multiperiod matching
- Stability in repeated matching markets
- Stability of marriage with externalities
- Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
- The farsighted stable set
- Two-sided matching problems with externalities
- von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching
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