Choice or competition: does integration benefit everyone?
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Cites work
- An analysis of the German university admissions system
- Axiomatization of the core of assignment games
- Axioms for deferred acceptance
- Can pre-arranged matches be avoided in two-sided matching markets?
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- College admissions with affirmative action
- Common enrollment in school choice
- Comparative statics in matching markets
- Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: an approach from discrete convex analysis
- Dynamic reserves in matching markets
- Effective affirmative action in school choice
- Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
- Fair matching under constraints: theory and applications
- Gainers and losers from market integration
- House allocation with existing tenants: a characterization
- Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
- Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
- Instability of centralized markets
- Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment
- Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
- Monotonicity and consistency in matching markets
- Monotonicity properties of bargaining solutions when applied to economics
- Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: strategy-proofness and comparative statics
- On cores and indivisibility
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility
- Responsive affirmative action in school choice
- School Choice with Consent*
- School choice with independent versus consolidated districts
- Social integration in two-sided matching markets
- Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition
- Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
- Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
- Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems
- Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
- The losses from integration in matching markets can be large
- Two algorithms for the student-project allocation problem
- Unified versus divided enrollment in school choice: improving student welfare in Chicago
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