Instability of centralized markets

DOI10.3982/ECTA15579MaRDI QIDQ5012756zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ahmad Peivandi, Rakesh V. Vohra

Publication date 25 November 2021

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta15579

zbMATH Keywords

core of incomplete information gamemechanism designstability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27) Mechanism design theory (91B03) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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(7)

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• The more the merrier? On the optimality of market size restrictions
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• Stability and optimal double auction design for a two-sided market
• Eroding market stability by proliferation of financial instruments

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