Local non-bossiness

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2026.106230MaRDI QIDQ7320821zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Eduardo Duque-Rosas, Juan Sebastián Pereyra, Juan Pablo Torres-Martínez

Publication date 27 August 2026

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JET.2026.106230

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites work

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