College admissions with budget complementarities

Cites work

A college admissions clearinghouse
A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
A labor market with heterogeneous firms and workers
A note on job matching with budget constraints
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
College admissions with tuition transfers
Common enrollment in school choice
Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods
Cores of convex games
Equilibria and Indivisibilities: Gross Substitutes and Complements
Equivalent choice functions and stable mechanisms
Graduate admission with financial support
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
Many-to-many matching: stable polyandrous polygamy (or polygamous polyandry)
Many-to-one matchings without substitutability
Matching with (branch-of-choice) contracts at the United States Military Academy
Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory
On a characterization of stable matchings
Stability and incentives for college admissions with budget constraints
Stability and preference alignment in matching and coalition formation
Stability, strategy-proofness, and cumulative offer mechanisms
Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings
The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
The stability of many-to-many matching with max-min preferences

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