Nash equilibria in the two-player kidney exchange game
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Publication:507331
DOI10.1007/S10107-016-1013-7zbMATH Open1414.91289OpenAlexW2341168876MaRDI QIDQ507331FDOQ507331
Authors: Margarida Carvalho, Andrea Lodi, João Pedro Pedroso, Ana Viana 
Publication date: 3 February 2017
Published in: Mathematical Programming. Series A. Series B (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10107-016-1013-7
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Cites Work
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- Paths, Trees, and Flowers
- Potential games
- Graph theory with applications
- TWO THEOREMS IN GRAPH THEORY
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- New insights on integer-programming models for the kidney exchange problem
- Mix and match: a strategyproof mechanism for multi-hospital kidney exchange
- Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange
- Pareto efficient Nash equilibria in discontinuous games
- An improved 2-agent kidney exchange mechanism
- Rational generating functions and integer programming games
Cited In (6)
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- IP solutions for international kidney exchange programmes
- Identifying optimal strategies in kidney exchange games is \(\varSigma_2^p\)-complete
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