A model of seller holdout
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Publication:1770135
DOI10.1007/s00199-003-0432-xzbMath1100.91034OpenAlexW2097215981MaRDI QIDQ1770135
Rohan Pitchford, Flavio M. Menezes
Publication date: 9 April 2005
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-003-0432-x
Related Items (14)
Bargaining order and delays in multilateral bargaining with heterogeneous sellers ⋮ Optimal mechanism for land acquisition ⋮ Convergence of VCG mechanism to ex-post budget balance in a model of land acquisition ⋮ Fairness and partial coercion in land assembly ⋮ Mechanism design for land acquisition ⋮ One-to-many bargaining when pairwise agreements are non-renegotiable ⋮ Breakdown in multilateral negotiations ⋮ Bargaining orders in a multi-person bargaining game ⋮ Bargaining for assembly ⋮ Expropriation power in private dealings: quota rule in collective sales ⋮ Transparency, complementarity and holdout ⋮ Settlement games with rank-order payoffs and applications to sovereign debt restructuring ⋮ Preemption with a second-mover advantage ⋮ Assembly Problems
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