Settlement games with rank-order payoffs and applications to sovereign debt restructuring

DOI10.1007/S00199-016-1001-4MaRDI QIDQ680968zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Rohan Pitchford, Mark L. J. Wright

Publication date 29 January 2018

Published in Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-1001-4

zbMATH Keywords

negotiationtiming gamessovereign debt

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Games of timing (91A55)

Recommendations

• Holdouts in sovereign debt restructuring: a theory of negotiation in a weak contractual environment
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Cites work

• A model of seller holdout
• Holdouts in sovereign debt restructuring: a theory of negotiation in a weak contractual environment
• Markov perfect equilibria in an N-player war of attrition
• The War of Attrition in Continuous Time with Complete Information

Cited in

(4)

• Introduction to the special issue on models of debt and debt crises
• Holdouts in sovereign debt restructuring: a theory of negotiation in a weak contractual environment
• A game theoretical approach to the international debt overhang
• Preemption with a second-mover advantage

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