Settlement games with rank-order payoffs and applications to sovereign debt restructuring
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Publication:680968
DOI10.1007/S00199-016-1001-4zbMATH Open1398.91448OpenAlexW2528897681MaRDI QIDQ680968FDOQ680968
Rohan Pitchford, Mark L. J. Wright
Publication date: 29 January 2018
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-016-1001-4
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