Strategic Models of Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations
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Publication:4712946
DOI10.2307/2298017zbMATH Open0736.90084OpenAlexW2068533205MaRDI QIDQ4712946FDOQ4712946
Authors: Raquel Fernández, Robert W. Rosenthal 
Publication date: 25 June 1992
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2298017
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Cited In (13)
- A game theoretical approach to the international debt overhang
- Default and Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model of Debt
- Forgive or buy back: An experimental study of debt relief
- Holdouts in sovereign debt restructuring: a theory of negotiation in a weak contractual environment
- Equilibrium selection in bargaining models.
- Birds of a feather: separating spillovers from shocks in sovereign default
- Strategic delay and endogeneous offers in bargaining games with private information
- Debt Renegotiations Outside Distress
- Private Investment and Sovereign Debt Negotiations
- Repudiation and Renegotiation: The Case of Sovereign Debt
- Bargained haircuts and debt policy implications
- Introduction to the special issue on models of debt and debt crises
- Settlement games with rank-order payoffs and applications to sovereign debt restructuring
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