A game theoretical approach to the international debt overhang

DOI10.1007/BF01234799zbMATH Open0776.90008MaRDI QIDQ685033FDOQ685033

Authors: Mamoru Kaneko, Jacek Prokop 

Publication date: 21 September 1993

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumdebt overhanginternational financial problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Bank Heterogeneity, Reputation and Debt Renegotiation
• Strategic Models of Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations

Cited In (5)

• Game-theoretic approach to bank loan repayment
• Strategic delay and endogeneous offers in bargaining games with private information
• On the probability of breakdown in participation games
• Can players avoid the tragedy of the commons in a joint debt game?
• Settlement games with rank-order payoffs and applications to sovereign debt restructuring

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