A game theoretical approach to the international debt overhang

DOI10.1007/BF01234799MaRDI QIDQ685033zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Mamoru Kaneko, Jacek Prokop

Publication date 21 September 1993

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumdebt overhanginternational financial problem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3126031 (Why is no real title available?)
• Bank Heterogeneity, Reputation and Debt Renegotiation
• Strategic Models of Sovereign-Debt Renegotiations

Cited in

(5)

• Strategic delay and endogeneous offers in bargaining games with private information
• Settlement games with rank-order payoffs and applications to sovereign debt restructuring
• Can players avoid the tragedy of the commons in a joint debt game?
• On the probability of breakdown in participation games
• Game-theoretic approach to bank loan repayment

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