Hold-up in vertical hierarchies with adverse selection

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.09.025MaRDI QIDQ1672733zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alberto Palermo

Publication date 11 September 2018

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.09.025

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionbargaininghold-up

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem
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Cites work

• Alternating-offer bargaining over menus under incomplete information
• Bargaining over incentive contracts
• Contract design and bargaining power

Cited in

(2)

• A model of seller holdout
• Endogenous residual claimancy by vertical hierarchies

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