Strategy-proof rules for two public goods: double median rules
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Publication:2453403
DOI10.1007/S00355-012-0713-ZzbMATH Open1288.91087OpenAlexW2013000318MaRDI QIDQ2453403FDOQ2453403
Authors: Eun Jeong Heo 
Publication date: 6 June 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0713-z
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Cites Work
- Equal or proportional division of a surplus, and other methods
- Strategy-proofness and ``median voters
- Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules.
- Multiple public goods and lexicographic preferences: Replacement principle
- Locating libraries on a street
- An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
- The replacement principle for the provision of multiple public goods on tree networks
- Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities
- Self-selection consistent functions
- Efficiency and consistency for locating multiple public facilities
- The separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
Cited In (6)
- Weighted majoritarian rules for the location of multiple public facilities
- Strategy-proof location of public facilities
- The capacity constrained facility location problem
- Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities
- On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals
- Three public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle
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