Strategy-proof rules for two public goods: double median rules

DOI10.1007/S00355-012-0713-ZMaRDI QIDQ2453403zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Eun Jeong Heo

Publication date 6 June 2014

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0713-z

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

• Strategy-proof location of public facilities
• Strategy-proofness and ``median voters
• Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities
• Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules.
• Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods

Cites work

• An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
• Efficiency and consistency for locating multiple public facilities
• Equal or proportional division of a surplus, and other methods
• Locating libraries on a street
• Multiple public goods and lexicographic preferences: Replacement principle
• Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules.
• Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities
• Self-selection consistent functions
• Strategy-proofness and ``median voters
• The replacement principle for the provision of multiple public goods on tree networks
• The separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences

Cited in

(6)

• Strategy-proof location of public facilities
• The capacity constrained facility location problem
• Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities
• Weighted majoritarian rules for the location of multiple public facilities
• On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals
• Three public goods and lexicographic preferences: replacement principle

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