Extending tournament solutions
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3642995 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3972536 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3976693 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1102774 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1131289 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- Banks winners in tournaments are difficult to recognize
- Characterization of dominance relations in finite coalitional games
- Choosing from a tournament
- Comparison functions and choice correspondences
- Condorcet choice correspondences for weak tournaments
- Cyclic tournaments and cooperative majority voting: A solution
- Dutta's minimal covering set and Shapley's saddles
- Evaluation and decision models with multiple criteria. Stepping stones for the analyst.
- Handbook of Computational Social Choice
- Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
- Mixed refinements of Shapley's saddles and weak tournaments
- On the structure of stable tournament solutions
- Possible and necessary winners of partial tournaments
- Rational Selection of Decision Functions
- Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness
- Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability
- Statement of precedence and a comment on IIA terminology
- The Computational Complexity of Choice Sets
- The Copeland choice function. An axiomatic characterization
- The bipartisan set of a tournament game
- Tournament games and positive tournaments
- Tournament solutions and majority voting
- Uncovered sets
- Voting games, indifference, and consistent sequential choice rules
Cited in
(12)- A solution for abstract decision problems based on maximum flow value
- The flow network method
- Margin of victory for tournament solutions
- A consistent tournament solution
- A tournament problem
- Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions
- A new old solution for weak tournaments
- Choosing from a large tournament
- Modeling optimal social choice: matrix-vector representation of various solution concepts based on majority rule
- On the discriminative power of tournament solutions
- Tournament solutions
- In the beginning there were \(n\) agents: founding and amending a constitution
This page was built for publication: Extending tournament solutions
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1616754)