Extending tournament solutions

DOI10.1007/S00355-018-1112-XMaRDI QIDQ1616754zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Paul Harrenstein

Publication date 7 November 2018

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-018-1112-x

zbMATH Keywords

conservative extensiontournamentsocial choice functionsmajoritarian functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of graph theory (05C90) Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

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• Tournament solutions and majority voting
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Cited in

(13)

• A consistent tournament solution
• Tournament solutions
• Choosing from a large tournament
• On the discriminative power of tournament solutions
• A solution for abstract decision problems based on maximum flow value
• A tournament problem
• On locally rationalizable social choice functions
• Modeling optimal social choice: matrix-vector representation of various solution concepts based on majority rule
• Margin of victory for tournament solutions
• Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions
• In the beginning there were n agents: founding and amending a constitution
• The flow network method
• A new old solution for weak tournaments

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