Electing a representative committee by approval ballot: an impossibility result

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.04.009MaRDI QIDQ741310zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Conal Duddy

Publication date 11 September 2014

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.04.009

zbMATH Keywords

approval votingcommitteemanipulability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Does choosing committees from approval balloting fulfill the electorate's will?
• Justified representation in approval-based committee voting
• On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules
• Approval elections with a variable number of winners
• Approval balloting for multi-winner elections

Cites work

• Approval balloting for multi-winner elections
• Approval voting on dichotomous preferences
• Approval voting: three examples
• Does choosing committees from approval balloting fulfill the electorate's will?
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3854738 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3641150 (Why is no real title available?)
• On the manipulability of approval voting and related scoring rules
• Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting
• The basic approval voting game
• The strategic sincerity of approval voting

Cited in

(3)

• Justified representation in approval-based committee voting
• Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees
• Does choosing committees from approval balloting fulfill the electorate's will?

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