Manipulability in a group activity selection problem
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3864918 (Why is no real title available?)
- Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences
- Finding strategyproof social choice functions via SAT solving
- Group activity selection problem with approval preferences
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Manipulation of social choice functions
- Researching with whom? Stability and manipulation
- Stability in coalition formation games
- Stable and Pareto optimal group activity selection from ordinal preferences
- Strategy-proof coalition formation
- Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size
- Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences
- Strategy-proof social choice correspondences.
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategy-proofness and Essentially Single-valued Cores
- The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences
- Unique stability in simple coalition formation games
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