Rank-based choice correspondences

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(96)00877-4MaRDI QIDQ673207zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jean-François Laslier

Publication date 28 February 1997

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(96)00877-4

zbMATH Keywords

ParetoSocial choiceVoting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Social choice (91B14)

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3400720 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• Axiomatic derivation of scoring rules without the ordering assumption
• Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions
• Condorcet Social Choice Functions
• Condorcet choice correspondences: A set-theoretical comparison
• Copeland method. II: Manipulation, monotonicity, and paradoxes
• Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence
• Cyclic tournaments and cooperative majority voting: A solution
• Geometry of voting
• Social Choice Scoring Functions
• Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
• The bipartisan set of a tournament game

Cited in

(9)

• On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions
• Ranking committees, income streams or multisets
• Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness
• A rank-based selection with cardinal payoffs and a cost of choice
• Generalizing the concept of binary choice systems induced by rankings: One way of probabilizing deterministic measurement structures
• Duplication in OWA-generated positional aggregation rules
• Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules
• Ranking responses in multiple-choice questions
• Consistency of scoring rules: a reinvestigation of composition-consistency

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