Evolutionary stability in a reputational model of bargaining.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00029-0MaRDI QIDQ1408706zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dilip Abreu, Rajiv Sethi

Publication date 25 September 2003

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00029-0

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingevolutionary stabilityreputational model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Review text

In this research work the authors endogenize departures from rationality on the foundations of the processes concerning the evolutionary selections, using for appropriate interpretations some adequate kinds of probabilities, in the environments with unobservable players types. The paper contains important results in this field of knowledge, with significant arguments, pertinent computational proofs and appropriate selective references.

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Cites work

• An evolutionary model of bargaining
• An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
• Bargaining and Reputation
• Bargaining with Two-sided Incomplete Information: An Infinite Horizon Model with Alternating Offers
• Evolution of smart\(_ n\) players
• Evolutionarily stable sets
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 43585 (Why is no real title available?)
• On the evolution of optimizing behavior
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Reputation and imperfect information
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• The logic of animal conflict

Cited in

(13)

• Clever agents in Young's evolutionary bargaining model
• Evolution of smart\(_ n\) players
• Evolutionary models of bargaining: Comparing agent-based computational and analytical approaches to understanding convention evolution
• Building reputation in a war of attrition game: hawkish or dovish stance?
• Coevolution of deception and preferences: Darwin and Nash meet Machiavelli
• Evolutionarily stable in-group favoritism and out-group spite in intergroup conflict
• The power of outside options in the presence of obstinate types
• Audience costs and reputation in crisis bargaining
• Equilibrium vengeance
• Evolution, bargaining, and time preferences
• Reputation and Survival: Learning in a Dynamic Signalling Model
• Bargaining with incomplete information: evolutionary stability in finite populations
• REPUTATION BY IMITATION: AN EVOLUTIONARY MODEL WITH STRATEGIC MATCHING

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