(Sophisticated) stable sets in exchange economies

DOI10.1006/GAME.2001.0890zbMATH Open1018.91007OpenAlexW1992818571MaRDI QIDQ700126FDOQ700126

Authors: Joseph Greenberg, Xiao Luo, Reza Oladi, Benyamin Shitovitz 

Publication date: 30 September 2002

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0890

Recommendations

• Symmetric von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in pure exchange economies.
• A reformulation of von Neumann-Morgenstern stability: \(m\)-stability
• Core and stable sets of exchange economies with externalities
• Stable sets for asymmetric information economies
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1531164

zbMATH Keywords

von Neumann-Morgenstern stable setNTU gamespure exchange economy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Cites Work

• Theory of games and economic behavior.
• Cores of convex games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
• Axiomatic bargaining theory on economic environments
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (19)

• Farsighted house allocation
• A reformulation of von Neumann-Morgenstern stability: \(m\)-stability
• An existence result for farsighted stable sets of games in characteristic function form
• General systems and \(\varphi\)-stable sets --- a formal analysis of socioeconomic environments
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Stable sets for asymmetric information economies
• Single-payoff farsighted stable sets in strategic games with dominant punishment strategies
• Farsighted stability of the competitive allocations in an exchange economy with indivisible goods
• Stable sets of allocations and the provision of public goods
• Market networks: the core
• On the foundation of stability
• Farsightedly stable tariffs
• The proportional ordinal Shapley solution for pure exchange economies
• Cooperative games (von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets)
• Core and stable sets of exchange economies with externalities
• Symmetric von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in pure exchange economies.
• Stable allocations in discrete exchange economies
• On stability of economic networks
• Conservative stable standards of behavior and \(\varphi\)-stable sets

This page was built for publication: (Sophisticated) stable sets in exchange economies

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q700126)