Core and stable sets of exchange economies with externalities

DOI10.1007/s40505-022-00239-xzbMath1520.91032OpenAlexW3189363960MaRDI QIDQ6164124

Maria Gabriella Graziano, Nicholas C. Yannelis, Claudia Meo

Publication date: 27 July 2023

Published in: Economic Theory Bulletin (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.csef.it/WP/wp617.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

corestable setsexternalitiesother-regarding preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

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