An exchange economy can have an empty \(\alpha\)-core

DOI10.1007/BF01215382zbMath0819.90013MaRDI QIDQ1341504

Charles Holly

Publication date: 5 September 1995

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

exchange economyempty \(\alpha\)-core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (10)

A weak \(\alpha\)-core existence theorem of generalized games with infinitely many players and pseudo-utilities ⋮ Incentive compatibility and information superiority of the core of an economy with differential information ⋮ Social loss with respect to the core of an economy with externalities ⋮ Existence of alpha-core allocations in economies with non-ordered and discontinuous preferences ⋮ The hybrid equilibria and core selection in exchange economies with externalities ⋮ Non-emptiness of the fuzzy core in a finite production economy with infinite-dimensional commodity space ⋮ The weak hybrid equilibria of an exchange economy with a continuum of agents and externalities ⋮ Core and stable sets of exchange economies with externalities ⋮ The weak \(\alpha\)-core of exchange economies with a continuum of players and pseudo-utilities ⋮ Coalitional instability of the distributive Lindahl equilibrium

Cites Work

• A generalization of Scarf's theorem: An \(\alpha\)-core existence theorem without transitivity or completeness
• The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments
• Unnamed Item

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