Stable coalition structures under restricted coalitional changes
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Cites work
- An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
- Coalition formation among farsighted agents
- Coalitions, agreements and efficiency
- Cooperative games with coalition structures
- Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
- Equilibrium binding agreements
- Farsighted coalitional stability
- Farsightedness and cautiousness in coalition formation games with positive spillovers
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
- Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
- Sequential formation of coalitions through bilateral agreements in a Cournot setting
- Stable coalition structures with externalities
- The core of an economy with a common pool resource: a partition function form approach
- The recursive core for non-superadditive games
Cited in
(17)- Stable coalition structures in symmetric majority games: a coincidence between myopia and farsightedness
- Farsightedness and cautiousness in coalition formation games with positive spillovers
- A coalition formation value for games in partition function form
- A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games
- Coalition formation among farsighted agents
- On the social stability of coalitional property rights regimes
- Stable farsighted coalitions in competitive markets
- Stable cooperation in a game with a major player
- Accessibility and stability of the coalition structure core
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 679843 (Why is no real title available?)
- Restricted Coalition Formation
- Simulating a sequential coalition formation process for the climate change problem: first come, but second served?
- Stable coalition structures in dynamic competitive environment
- Cooperative games (von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets)
- COALITION FORMATION IN GAMES WITHOUT SYNERGIES
- Minimal enforceability and indirect domination relations in the Shapley-Scarf economy
- Equal division among the few: an experiment about coalition formation and vNM stable set in a three-person game
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