Overbidding and underbidding in package allocation problems

DOI10.1007/S00355-024-01506-5MaRDI QIDQ6580468zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Marina Núñez, Francisco Robles

Publication date 29 July 2024

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/S00355-024-01506-5

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Recommendations

• A mechanism for package allocation problems with gross substitutes
• The package assignment model.
• Package Auctions and Exchanges
• Multi-object auctions with package bidding: an experimental comparison of Vickrey and iBEA
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Cites work

• Ascending prices and package bidding: further experimental analysis
• Characterizing the Vickrey combinatorial auction by induction
• Combinatorial auctions. Foreword by Vernon L. Smith.
• Core-selecting package auctions
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
• Implementing efficient multi-object auction institutions: An experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• Package Auctions and Exchanges
• The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
• The package assignment model.

Cited in

(1)

• Simple manipulations of Walrasian equilibrium rules in assignment problems

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