First price package auction with many traders

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2017.01.001MaRDI QIDQ516057zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yasuhiro Shirata

Publication date 20 March 2017

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10252/5134

zbMATH Keywords

bidder optimal corepackage auctionVCG outcomeWalrasian pricing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Package Auctions and Exchanges
• The package assignment model.
• Core-selecting package auctions
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• An equilibrium analysis of a core-selecting package auction with reserve prices

Cites work

• Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
• Combinatorial auctions. Foreword by Vernon L. Smith.
• Common Agency
• Core-selecting package auctions
• Efficiency of Large Double Auctions
• Games Played Through Agents
• Internet auctions with many traders
• Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
• On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
• Substitute goods, auctions, and equilibrium
• The Core of an N Person Game
• The package assignment model.

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