Bounds in auctions with unobserved heterogeneity
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Publication:4645402
DOI10.3982/QE167zbMATH Open1419.91309MaRDI QIDQ4645402FDOQ4645402
Authors: Timothy B. Armstrong 
Publication date: 10 January 2019
Published in: Quantitative Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
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Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Asymptotic distribution theory in statistics (62E20) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Cited In (12)
- Identification and estimation of auction model with two-dimensional unobserved heterogeneity
- Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply -- experimental evidence
- Estimation of a Dynamic Auction Game
- Order statistics approaches to unobserved heterogeneity in auctions
- Identification in ascending auctions, with an application to digital rights management
- The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders
- Unobserved heterogeneity in auctions under restricted stochastic dominance
- Integrated-Quantile-Based Estimation for First-Price Auction Models
- Unobserved correlation in private-value ascending auctions
- Identification and estimation of auction models with unobserved heterogeneity
- Explaining deviations from equilibrium in auctions with avoidable fixed costs
- Identification of first-price auctions with non-separable unobserved heterogeneity
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