On the Trade off Between Deficit and Inefficiency and the Double Auction with a Fixed Transaction Fee
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Publication:5489077
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00587.xzbMath1145.91337MaRDI QIDQ5489077
Publication date: 25 September 2006
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00587.x
asymmetric information; taxes; large markets; asymptotic efflciency; Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism
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