On the Trade off Between Deficit and Inefficiency and the Double Auction with a Fixed Transaction Fee

DOI10.1111/J.1468-0262.2005.00587.XzbMATH Open1145.91337OpenAlexW2052000699MaRDI QIDQ5489077FDOQ5489077

Authors: Tymon Tatur 

Publication date: 25 September 2006

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00587.x

Recommendations

• The deficit on each trade in a Vickrey double auction is at least as large as the Walrasian price gap
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• Fixed price approximability of the optimal gain from trade
• Ex ante efficient, ex post individually rational trade
• Double auction with interdependent values: incentives and efficiency

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationtaxeslarge marketsasymptotic efflciencyMyerson-Satterthwaite theorem, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Trade models (91B60)

Cited In (7)

• Optimal private good allocation: the case for a balanced budget
• When Walras meets Vickrey
• Trade reduction vs. multi-stage: a comparison of double auction design approaches
• The rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms
• Simple market protocols for efficient risk sharing
• Cost of efficiency in trading perfect complements
• The deficit on each trade in a Vickrey double auction is at least as large as the Walrasian price gap

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