Minimax regret and failure to converge to efficiency in large markets

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.010zbMath1452.91167OpenAlexW3076596654MaRDI QIDQ2212758

Rachel C. Shafer

Publication date: 24 November 2020

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.010

zbMATH Keywords

decision theoryambiguitymechanism designregret minimizationdouble auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

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• Convergence to Efficiency in a Simple Market with Incomplete Information
• Mechanism design with maxmin agents: Theory and an application to bilateral trade
• Knightian Analysis of the Vickrey Mechanism
• Efficiency of Large Double Auctions
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
• The Theory of Statistical Decision

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