Uncommon Knowledge in Multiparty Auctions

DOI10.1287/deca.2022.0454OpenAlexW4280545227MaRDI QIDQ5868906

No author found.

Publication date: 26 September 2022

Published in: Decision Analysis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/deca.2022.0454

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric auctionsfirst-price auctionsBayesian methodsadversarial risk analysispure strategy Nash equilibrialevel \(k\) thinking

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
• Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
• Adversarial Risk Analysis
• Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
• Numerical Solution of Asymmetric Auctions
• Adversarial Risk Analysis for Auctions Using Mirror Equilibrium and Bayes Nash Equilibrium
• Adversarial risk analysis for first‐price sealed‐bid auctions

This page was built for publication: Uncommon Knowledge in Multiparty Auctions