A principal-agent problem with heterogeneous demand distributions for a carbon capture and storage system
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Publication:1694340
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2017.06.009zbMath1380.91094OpenAlexW2623174919MaRDI QIDQ1694340
Publication date: 1 February 2018
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2017.06.009
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Uses Software
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