Existence and monotonicity of solutions to moral hazard problems

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2004.08.002zbMATH Open1117.91378OpenAlexW2018090886MaRDI QIDQ2581789FDOQ2581789

Authors: Guillaume Carlier, R. A. Dana 

Publication date: 10 January 2006

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/5371

Recommendations

• The existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems
• Existence and non-existence in the moral hazard problem
• A general solution method for moral hazard problems
• Monotonicity of optimal contracts without the first-order approach
• Moral hazard with bounded payments

zbMATH Keywords

SupermodularityRearrangementsFirst-order approach

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• An Inequality for Rearrangements
• On the existence of optimal contract mechanisms for incomplete information principal-agent models
• The existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model
• Optimal contract mechanisms for principal-agent problems with moral hazard and adverse selection

Cited In (15)

• Moral hazard with bounded payments
• Rearrangement inequalities in non-convex insurance models
• The optimal insurance policy for the general fixed cost of handling an indemnity under rank-dependent expected utility
• Existence and non-existence in the moral hazard problem
• Equimeasurable rearrangements with capacities
• Quantifying the social welfare loss in moral hazard models
• Principal-multiagents problem under equivalent changes of measure: general study and an existence result
• Moral hazard with non-additive uncertainty: when are actions implementable?
• The existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems
• Monotonicity of optimal contracts without the first-order approach
• A principal-agent problem with heterogeneous demand distributions for a carbon capture and storage system
• Moral hazard with limited liability: random-variable formulation and optimal contract structures
• Moral hazard with a finite number of states
• Optimal insurance design under rank-dependent expected utility
• Stochastic programming perspective on the agency problems under uncertainty

This page was built for publication: Existence and monotonicity of solutions to moral hazard problems

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2581789)