Rearrangement inequalities in non-convex insurance models

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Publication:2387404

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2004.12.004zbMath1106.91038OpenAlexW2039595170MaRDI QIDQ2387404

Guillaume Carlier, Rose-Anne Dana

Publication date: 2 September 2005

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://basepub.dauphine.fr/handle/123456789/5389



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