WAGE‐RISE CONTRACT AND QUANTITY COMPETITION WITH PROFIT‐MAXIMIZING AND LABOUR‐MANAGED FIRMS
DOI10.1111/J.1467-8586.2010.00391.XzbMATH Open1254.91305OpenAlexW1978459270MaRDI QIDQ4899993FDOQ4899993
Authors: Kazuhiro Ohnishi
Publication date: 10 January 2013
Published in: Bulletin of Economic Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8586.2010.00391.x
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