Optimal contracts and the role of the government in wage bargaining

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.12.016MaRDI QIDQ433161zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Lilia Cavallari

Publication date 13 July 2012

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.016

zbMATH Keywords

fiscal policy commitmentinflation targetoptimal wage contractsocial pactwage bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Cites work

• Monetary conservatism and fiscal coordination in a monetary union
• Strategic Monetary Policy with Non-Atomistic Wage Setters

Cited in

(3)

• WAGE‐RISE CONTRACT AND QUANTITY COMPETITION WITH PROFIT‐MAXIMIZING AND LABOUR‐MANAGED FIRMS
• Wage bargaining as an optimal control problem: A dynamic version of the right-to-manage model
• Central bank inflation contracts and strategic wage setting in a multiunion economy

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