Walrasian's characterization and a universal ascending auction
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Publication:2013362
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.05.013zbMATH Open1393.91073arXiv1605.03826OpenAlexW2963915734MaRDI QIDQ2013362FDOQ2013362
Authors: Oren Ben-Zwi 
Publication date: 17 August 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: We introduce a novel characterization of all Walrasian price vectors in terms of forbidden over- and under demanded sets for monotone gross substitute combinatorial auctions. For ascending and descending auctions we suggest a universal framework for finding the minimum or maximum Walrasian price vectors for monotone gross substitute combinatorial auctions. An ascending (descending) auction is guaranteed to find the minimum (maximum) Walrasian if and only if it follows the suggested framework.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1605.03826
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Cited In (6)
- A flow-based ascending auction to compute buyer-optimal Walrasian prices
- On the construction of substitutes
- The finite matroid-based valuation conjecture is false
- Social welfare in search games with asymmetric information
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- Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model
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