Walrasian's characterization and a universal ascending auction

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.05.013MaRDI QIDQ2013362zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Oren Ben-Zwi

Publication date 17 August 2017

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1605.03826

zbMATH Keywords

characterizationascending auctionsWalrasiangross substitute

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Abstract: We introduce a novel characterization of all Walrasian price vectors in terms of forbidden over- and under demanded sets for monotone gross substitute combinatorial auctions. For ascending and descending auctions we suggest a universal framework for finding the minimum or maximum Walrasian price vectors for monotone gross substitute combinatorial auctions. An ascending (descending) auction is guaranteed to find the minimum (maximum) Walrasian if and only if it follows the suggested framework.

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Cites work

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Cited in

(6)

• Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model
• Sets in excess demand in simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders
• A flow-based ascending auction to compute buyer-optimal Walrasian prices
• The finite matroid-based valuation conjecture is false
• Social welfare in search games with asymmetric information
• On the construction of substitutes

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