Simple games with many effective voters

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.03.015zbMATH Open1197.91079OpenAlexW2092008736MaRDI QIDQ844903FDOQ844903

Authors: Eyal Beigman 

Publication date: 5 February 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.03.015

Recommendations

• ON SIMPLE GAMES WITH PERMISSION OF VOTERS
• Simple games versus weighted voting games
• Games with multiple alternatives applied to voting systems
• On the core of voting games
• Hierarchies in voting simple games
• The basic approval voting game
• Mathematical structures of simple voting games
• Representative voting games
• Easy weighted majority games
• Symmetry of simple games and permission of voters.

zbMATH Keywords

Ramsey theoryindeterminacysimple gamessocial choicecommittee voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Social choice and individual values
• Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
• Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
• General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models
• Basic Geometry of Voting
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• A dictionary for voting paradoxes
• The Voting Problem
• A theory of the learnable
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Why Are Certain Properties of Binary Relations Relatively More Common in Natural Language?
• Learnability and rationality of choice.
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Social Indeterminacy
• On the learnability of majority rule

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