ON SIMPLE GAMES WITH PERMISSION OF VOTERS

DOI10.15807/JORSJ.42.286MaRDI QIDQ4538149zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Akira Yamazaki, Takehiro Inohara, Bunpei Nakano

Publication date 11 July 2002

Published in Journal of the Operations Research Society of Japan (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.15807/jorsj.42.286

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• New interpretation of the core of simple games in terms of voters' permission.
• Generalizations of the concept of core of simple games and their characterization in terms of permission of voters.
• Symmetry of simple games and permission of voters.
• Games with permission structures: The conjunctive approach
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1841889

Cited in

(5)

• Simple games with many effective voters
• Composite consensus-building process: permissible meeting analysis and compromise choice exploration
• Comparability of coalitions in committees with permission of voters by using desirability relation with hopefulness relation.
• Symmetry of simple games and permission of voters.
• New interpretation of the core of simple games in terms of voters' permission.

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