A note on balancedness and nonemptiness of the core in voting games (Q1123825)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4110504
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| English | A note on balancedness and nonemptiness of the core in voting games |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4110504 |
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A note on balancedness and nonemptiness of the core in voting games (English)
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1989
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\textit{J. Greenberg}'s result [Econometrica 47, 627-636 (1979; Zbl 0423.90007)] on the non-emptiness of the core of a majority game in \({\mathbb{R}}^ m\) is generalized to arbitrary voting games. More recently \textit{J. Greenberg} and \textit{Sh. Weber} [Int. J. Game Theory 13, 65-68 (1984; Zbl 0537.90004)] have shown that the majority game is balanced. In this paper, the author shows that this result cannot be generalized to arbitrary voting games.
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balancedness
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simple games
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non-emptiness of the core
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majority game
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voting games
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0.8866523
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