Condorcet meets Bentham

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.04.006zbMath1319.91073OpenAlexW264156656WikidataQ56081054 ScholiaQ56081054MaRDI QIDQ492869

Marcus Pivato

Publication date: 21 August 2015

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.04.006

zbMATH Keywords

Condorcet winnerutilitarianspatial voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules ⋮ Weighted representative democracy

Cites Work

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• Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules
• The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
• Egalitarianism and utilitarianism in committees of representatives
• The welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas
• Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency
• One person/one vote is not efficient given information on factions
• Majority rule and general decision rules
• Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach
• Unlikelihood of Condorcet's paradox in a large society
• Voting rules as statistical estimators
• PARETO EFFICIENCY AND WEIGHTED MAJORITY RULES
• Conditions for Voting Equilibria in Continuous Voter Distributions
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index

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