Condorcet meets Bentham
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Publication:492869
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2015.04.006zbMATH Open1319.91073OpenAlexW264156656WikidataQ56081054 ScholiaQ56081054MaRDI QIDQ492869FDOQ492869
Authors: Marcus Pivato 
Publication date: 21 August 2015
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.04.006
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Cites Work
- Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
- Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency
- One person/one vote is not efficient given information on factions
- Majority rule and general decision rules
- Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach
- Unlikelihood of Condorcet's paradox in a large society
- Voting rules as statistical estimators
- Pareto efficiency and weighted majority rules
- Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules
- Egalitarianism and utilitarianism in committees of representatives
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Conditions for Voting Equilibria in Continuous Voter Distributions
- The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
- The welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas
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