Condorcet meets Bentham

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2015.04.006MaRDI QIDQ492869zbMATHOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Marcus Pivato

Publication date 21 August 2015

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.04.006

zbMATH Keywords

Condorcet winnerutilitarianspatial voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5480956 (Why is no real title available?)
• Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules
• Conditions for Voting Equilibria in Continuous Voter Distributions
• Egalitarianism and utilitarianism in committees of representatives
• Majority rule and general decision rules
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
• Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency
• One person/one vote is not efficient given information on factions
• Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach
• Pareto efficiency and weighted majority rules
• The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
• The welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas
• Unlikelihood of Condorcet's paradox in a large society
• Voting rules as statistical estimators

Cited in

(10)

• Popular support for social evaluation functions
• Condorcet meets Ellsberg
• Cartan meets Chaplygin
• Formal utilitarianism and range voting
• The greatest unhappiness of the least number
• Generalized majority rules: utilitarian welfare in large but finite populations
• Weighted representative democracy
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4108443 (Why is no real title available?)
• Rawls and Bentham reconciled
• Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules

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