Condorcet meets Ellsberg

DOI10.3982/TE1284MaRDI QIDQ4586056zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors

Publication date 11 September 2018

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te1284

zbMATH Keywords

ambiguityinformation aggregationvoting, elections

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cited in

(16)

• Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences
• On dynamic consistency in ambiguous games
• Evaluating ambiguous random variables from Choquet to maxmin expected utility
• Voting on tricky questions
• A theory of unanimous jury voting with an ambiguous likelihood
• Dynamic semi-consistency
• A note on pivotality
• (Not) delegating decisions to experts: the effect of uncertainty
• Editorial. Introduction to the special issue political games: strategy, persuasion, and learning
• Polarization and inefficient information aggregation under strategic voting
• On the consensus effect
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4164501 (Why is no real title available?)
• Efficient equilibria in common interest voting games
• Strategic ambiguity in global games
• Information aggregation under ambiguity: theory and experimental evidence
• Feddersen and Pesendorfer meet Ellsberg

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