Condorcet meets Ellsberg
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Publication:4586056
DOI10.3982/TE1284zbMath1395.91157OpenAlexW2259543405MaRDI QIDQ4586056
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Publication date: 11 September 2018
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te1284
Related Items (12)
Feddersen and Pesendorfer meet Ellsberg ⋮ Dynamic semi-consistency ⋮ A note on pivotality ⋮ (Not) delegating decisions to experts: the effect of uncertainty ⋮ Editorial. Introduction to the special issue political games: strategy, persuasion, and learning ⋮ Polarization and inefficient information aggregation under strategic voting ⋮ Evaluating ambiguous random variables from Choquet to maxmin expected utility ⋮ Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences ⋮ On dynamic consistency in ambiguous games ⋮ Voting on tricky questions ⋮ On the consensus effect ⋮ A theory of unanimous jury voting with an ambiguous likelihood
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