Condorcet meets Bentham (Q492869)

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scientific article

Language	Label	Description	Also known as
English	Condorcet meets Bentham	scientific article

Statements

scholarly article

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Condorcet meets Bentham (English)

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Journal of Mathematical Economics

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publication date

21 August 2015

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zbMATH Keywords

utilitarian

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Condorcet winner

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spatial voting

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MaRDI profile type

MaRDI publication profile

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full work available at URL

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.04.006

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PARETO EFFICIENCY AND WEIGHTED MAJORITY RULES

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Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency

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One person/one vote is not efficient given information on factions

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Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index

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Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach

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Egalitarianism and utilitarianism in committees of representatives

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The welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas

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Conditions for Voting Equilibria in Continuous Voter Distributions

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Voting rules as statistical estimators

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Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules

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The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule

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Majority rule and general decision rules

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Unlikelihood of Condorcet's paradox in a large society

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Identifiers

zbMATH Open document ID

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10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.04.006

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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zbMATH DE Number

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Sitelinks

Mathematics(1 entry)

mardi Publication:492869

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