How relevant are irrelevant alternatives?

DOI10.1007/BF00141104zbMATH Open0362.92016OpenAlexW2070850129MaRDI QIDQ1240176FDOQ1240176

Authors: Jean-Marie Blin 

Publication date: 1976

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00141104

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Cites Work

• Social choice and individual values
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Positionalist voting functions
• The independence condition in the theory of social choice
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
• Choice structures and preference relations
• Voting and group decision functions
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Preference aggregation and statistical estimation

Cited In (3)

• Independence of irrelevant alternatives revisited
• Decision making under uncertainty: Starr's domain criterion
• The welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas

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