The sensitivity of weight selection for scoring rules to profile proximity to single-peaked preferences

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0084-4zbMath1132.91397OpenAlexW2002995706MaRDI QIDQ2500750

William V. Gehrlein

Publication date: 18 August 2006

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0084-4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (4)

On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory ⋮ On the probability of observing Borda's paradox ⋮ Stability analysis of group decision-making under weighted scoring rules ⋮ The unexpected behavior of plurality rule

Cites Work

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• Probabilities of election outcomes with two parameters: the relative impact of unifying and polarizing candidates
• Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules
• Condorcet's paradox and the likelihood of its occurrence: Different perspectives on balanced preferences
• On the probability that all decision rules select the same winner
• Obtaining representations for probabilities of voting outcomes with effectively unlimited precision integer arithmetic
• Basic Geometry of Voting
• The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters

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