On the probability of observing Borda's paradox
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Publication:976964
DOI10.1007/s00355-009-0415-3zbMath1230.91037MaRDI QIDQ976964
William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley
Publication date: 16 June 2010
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0415-3
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IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report, Borda's paradox with weighted scoring rules, Another perspective on Borda's paradox, Computations of volumes and Ehrhart series in four candidates elections, Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser
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