The unexpected behavior of plurality rule
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Publication:1036103
DOI10.1007/s11238-008-9097-zzbMath1186.91078OpenAlexW2006357571MaRDI QIDQ1036103
William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley
Publication date: 4 November 2009
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-008-9097-z
Related Items (2)
IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report ⋮ On the probability of observing Borda's paradox
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