The unexpected behavior of plurality rule

DOI10.1007/s11238-008-9097-zzbMath1186.91078MaRDI QIDQ1036103

William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley

Publication date: 4 November 2009

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-008-9097-z

zbMATH Keywords

voting rules; single-peaked preferences; Condorcet efficieny

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B12: Voting theory

Related Items

IAC Probability Calculations in Voting Theory: Progress Report, On the probability of observing Borda's paradox

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