Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Broadly Resists Control
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
- The strategic sincerity of approval voting
- Strategy stability and sincerity in approval voting
- Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences
- Sincerity and manipulation under approval voting
- Sincere voting in an electorate with heterogeneous preferences
- Rank-dominant strategy and sincere voting
- Strategy-proof voting on the full preference domain
- Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
- Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3854738 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3639144 (Why is no real title available?)
- Anyone but him: the complexity of precluding an alternative
- Copeland Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control
- Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 1.
- How hard is it to control an election?
- Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
- Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The computational difficulty of manipulating an election
- The strategy-proofness landscape of merging
- Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
- Voting systems that combine approval and preference
Cited in
(6)- Parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections and related digraph problems
- Approval as an intrinsic part of preference
- Copeland Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control
- Hybrid Elections Broaden Complexity-Theoretic Resistance to Control
- Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control
- Normalized range voting broadly resists control
This page was built for publication: Sincere-Strategy Preference-Based Approval Voting Broadly Resists Control
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3599137)
